Alibaba Business Model

Abstract: â€Å"Alibaba† has experienced eight years of comprehensive development the establishment of a unique business model, and a new interpretation of e-commerce, launched a new Internet business model – Alibaba model. This new network business model not only for manufacturers to reduce production and marketing costs, but also to â€Å"Alibaba† cleverly avoided because of distribution, logistics and inventory, such as forming a bottleneck for the continued development of e-commerce industry opens up New roads.Alibaba in just a few years to create the myth that Alibaba model for a time and a lot of competitors to imitate the focus of attention. But Alibaba create a model is only a beginning, the Chinese e-commerce to go for their own development path, we must Alibaba model to analyze the advantages and disadvantages, so look for more market opportunities. More careful analysis point of view Alibaba e-commerce model of the advantages and disadvantages of resea rchers and the need to establish e-commerce for SMEs to provide information useful reference. Key words: Alibaba ; E-commerce model; Sales channel; Advantages and DisadvantagesAlibaba's success has told us that the distance between dreams and ideals are not far away, but it is not the pie fall from the sky, I have a few Friends and colleagues of a site visit and repeated after the team of research, we believe that Alibaba is the main success factors: Dream Team's combination of a clear development strategy + execution + effective + unique corporate culture †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ ? Now the results of our research and analysis to share with you, initiate, but also hope you criticism and valuable advice, and seek common A better future!Alibaba's success has been close to myth, even though he claims are using international standards themselves, and Ali Baba, not the slightest satisfaction. China's Internet, the business less than 5 years of Alibaba, to have the performance and impact of today, there must be worthy of him, digging Dig, and explore the profound connotation and unique reasons. Ali Baba in the success of many elements, we believe that interpretation of the dream team of Ali Baba, especially worthy of focus.Too many entrepreneurs Persons, entrepreneurs can not build a proper team, leading to their cause bottlenecks; the face of these bottlenecks in the case, although we Can find a very comprehensive theory of healing on the team, many Habitat for Humanity in the discourse of scholars lamented wake up to reality, you can continue to learn Imitation learning the truth from getting close, but once things really imminent, most people are still at a loss without a tree, sighed with regret of the free Copies.Dream Team Alibaba inspiration to us, allows us to wake up and look at itself, the team face the problem, stimulate program ideas, from This need not find any reason to stall themselves, deceive themselves, so that is directed at the core of the problem and find solutions. Ali Baba tells us: a prerequisite for establishing the team must have a clear strategy. An important strategy for an enterprise, no one has ever dared to be ignored. Establishment of an effective team must also be robust clear strategy when As a prerequisite, it is meaningful.Ali Baba that there is no clear strategy, there is no clear direction, no clear direction of the group Team, at best, but mob. Taste of Tang Seng Alibaba advocate team, it is very insightful, have long been ridiculed look down The â€Å"Simon did not know,† the monk, in accordance with the laws of the strategic priority measure, actually turned into a very competent leader, and why? As Buddhist sutras, he Clear and committed to adhere to the direction.Learn the reason for the entire â€Å"Journey to the West† can be set up, Monkey, Pig, Shahe Shang sex Cells was clear and became a valuable and complement each other good team structure. Strategy is both a prerequisite for the establishm ent of the team, but also the central figure on the team, the highest requirement standards. It is this point, when the company started horse Standing rhetoric cloud on the Great Wall, Ali Baba to do in China, the world's best e-commerce sites began to form a team for this well-laid A solid foundation.That the strategic objectives of Alibaba, the strict planning of the long-term goals and short-term objectives and specific practical war Surgery program. So, when Alibaba 1999 heat wave in the Internet and let an withdraw from the Beijing and fade into the paradise of Hangzhou, the public No one left behind and more entrepreneurs. Many people may not care about this, because to set a strategic goal of rhetoric is long term and many people Strengths.However, because of this, Ma and Alibaba China Internet will be the first to smell the smell of smoke in the bubble, and then be carried out Acclaimed series of thin rectification movement, to the attendant to Alibaba in the winter of the I nternet, maintain and enhance the team's strength, as The rise followed lay a solid foundation. Ali Baba tells us: there is no effective execution of all non-existent implementation is the true test of a team, of course, Measure of whether the marker of a team. Tang Seng, a team of four to Buddhist sutras, the definitely not get back, although four of them are present Mark clearly the strong.The team carefully explore the execution of Ali Baba, it is very surprising. The four â€Å"O† (CEO, Ma Yun, chief financial officer CFO Caichong Xin, Chief Technology Officer CTO Wu Jiong, Chief Human Officer CPO related Ming-sheng) and the team, their strengths and Entirely different characteristics, even in related fields are leading figures. These leading characters, explore their resumes to Found that they have a wealth of practical experience, has gradually grown from zero career success of their growth, the maximum quantity body Is the implementation of the charm and indispensable. Strategic direction is clear, the implementation of actions towards the direction of interpretation. For many friends, the parties may prefer to talk Direction and strategy, often overlooked and complicated implementation over time. On a team, the tireless performer is not necessarily an effective complementary Or the lack of scarce resources. Only the rich resources in this area and to join, be possible to show the strength of the team. Otherwise, whether or four monk Four Monkey King, the ultimate collapse of this team are very normal thing.Alibaba looked stunning the implementation details, whether every employee of a customer, whether products and services or staff Worker training programs, are known down to the executable can be seen the point of evaluation feedback can be, with the vice president as saying Kim Hang built, some rules and regulations Implementation of assessment criteria, did we all feel is not worth spending the time or costs, but the cost of all the important front in the implementation of all changes Was pale, but must yield.Ali Baba told us: There is no business of their own culture do not form a good team always. As a team, agree on the strategy, as the recognition of common mission, that is, the recognition of corporate culture. Without such recognition As a basis, the team only in the rain is blowing in a lax. Culture involves many aspects of a business culture is very easy to use one or two sentences General, it is difficult to nuanced interpretation of the details of the enterprise and among all levels.Alibaba trough the Internet during the plan and only 500 yuan per person salary. Took only form of pay is 500 yuan, 500 yuan but take only group Team dispersed, the cultural identity, contains the expectations on the prospects for long-term interests of the immediate interests of the discarded, the confidence of the enterprise, drip Flow with the same entrepreneurial spirit and blood. Without this cultural identity, not only unable to retain 500 per person Alibaba team, Ariba Barry worth of any person simply can not use the 500 exhibits.Very dramatically, not only to retain the original 500 venture group Team, but also attracted millions of dollars in salary as investors appeared Caichong Xin, this sounds like some mysterious circumstances in a true Ali Baba, Ali Baba visible cultural charm. Many enterprises create and can not recognize the role of culture, or that are certainly important but can not find ways and means of how to form construction, or The formation of self-righteous to build, is only a hobby and create a personal habit.To survive as a business development as mentioned above, leaving no Live talent, team morale and other phenomena, it will become normal and can not stop. Culture is building software, invisible, Can not find what you want and can not copy the clone. Alibaba experience tells us that: Create a culture, must have their first Culture. The culture here is not an ordinary sense of the culture, but have a deep understanding of the essence of the enterprise after the enterprise direction, mission, Team, a highly recognized and a consensus interpretation.He formed the atmosphere can be felt, not explained, people moving, people march in a huge Tension, to absorb the spirit of a strong, peaceful, tolerant, generous but challenging, progressive and positive factors. Ali Baba tells us: the only good team was excellent organizational structure may form the organizational structure and capacity and capability between the same teams In fact, the relationship is a mutually reinforcing one another indispensable and interdependent, the link is a healthy relationship.The operation of the enterprise, do not The operational phase with the needs of different teams to work, only the absolute best team, it may be in the enterprise through its continuous operations Adjustment at different stages of the mission capable. More teams will appear at different stages of the collapse of the different, the same as the pain can not be avoided. See fourth Internet â€Å"Competition on the West Lake† photos, almost all of the outstanding team of Internet companies have ceased to exist.Only Ariba Pakistan, five down, as the original, the only change is more confident, more refined, and more mature. This seems to inadvertently Alibaba Completed masterpiece, really surprised us insight: it is the team and organizational structure Alibaba interaction between, so that such a young Ability to organize a huge glow. A group of Internet enthusiasts that absolute idealism of action and color, not only create wealth God Words, and created a team of role models, creating a unique corporate culture, reating a large number of maverick darling of the new economy. Excellent organizational structure in the enterprise at different stages have different adjustments. The organizational capacity of the best from every employee who embodies, In the team gathered in the whole company broke out. Ali Baba said: to help customers and colleagues success is the best embodiment of their own success. Blindly chase Find their own success and the team will not be good team, and ultimately could not reach the other side of success.Alibaba ultimate understanding of the team, we think: There is no competent excellent team of key figures, it is impossible to form good team; Without the excellent team, the company can not have good execution; even execution are not the company, can not form a strong corporate culture , More can not form an effective organizational structure and organizational capacity. Inseparable link between this, which is full of inherent logic of the interdependence relations Department, both divisions of the importance of our team, but also tells us that, indeed, not every business or everyone can easily have a superior form Show team.

Movie: Film and Book

Nowadays, when many good novels are turned into good films, it can be tricky to decide which to enjoy first, the book or the film based on it. Reading the book is an intimate experience that can challenge your mind and tickle your heart. But watching the film is often more convenient, especially if you don't have much time. Not to mention that you get to see beautiful scenery and often a fine leg and some nudity as well. † During summer vacation, I read the book the hunger games.It was a great book. The details were so well put together. In my opinion the movie was Just plain awful, I didn't think it went well with the book. The book gives you more a visual look at it. The movie Just made it seem more spasmodic then it should have. What I comprehended from the book, Catkins Evergreen, the main character, was strong and fiery. When she went into battle, she knew exactly what she was fighting for. Catkins sometimes was in some muddle situations.The dilemma was, that she had to su rvive the hunger games or die. Catkins survived along with PETA. What I comprehended from the movie, minors dying along with adults or teenagers. It made it seem like an awful environment to live in. It seems that everyone in the society was admonishing each other. Sometimes I like the movie better than the book. In this case, I liked more the book then the movie. But In my opinion, read the book first and then watch the movie.

Change-oriented leadership trans formational and charismatic leaders Coursework - 1

Change-oriented leadership trans formational and charismatic leaders slp - Coursework Example In my opinion, this approach was more managerial in nature, as the supervisor conformed to previously set standards and sought to maintain the status quo. The supervisor did little to set new directions or establish new goals, as is the case for leaders who are more visionary-oriented. The Five Factor Model (FFM) outlines five personality dimensions, which include Neurotism, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Extraversion and Openness (OCEAN). Within each dimension are primary factors, which describe in detail individual qualities. Conscientiousness refers to an individual’s ability to be dependable and involved whereas agreeableness analyzes the degree to which one co-operates with others and their level of compassion. Conversely, extraversion encompasses one’s ability to interact socially with others whereas neurotism measures the degree of emotions instability such as an increased predisposition towards negative emptions such as anger or anxiety. Finally, openness to experience encompasses an individual’s curiosity level, love for adventure and ability to appreciate aesthetics. My supervisor was low in neurotism, high in extraversion, high in conscientiousness, low in agreeableness, and low in openness to experience. As the head on the inter nship program, he had developed a high tolerance from training interns. His subordinates could depend on him when faced with challenging issues and he had a good rapport with them, as he was a social person. However, from his plain office dà ©cor, it was clear that he had no appreciation of aesthetics; for example, art. The behavioral approach adopted by the supervisor was task-oriented. The company’s core task was customer satisfaction, which necessitated employees to establish a good rapport with the clients. As such, performance appraisals sought to evaluate an employee’s interactions with the clients based on the client’s feedback. The training seminars organized by the

Genetic Engineering Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Genetic Engineering - Essay Example This paper declares that one method that is gaining ground to cure genetically impaired individuals without so much objection on the part of its people is genetic engineering because it is not forced at individuals to be engineered, specially to eliminate defects. Genetic engineering that involves elimination of defects is called negative genetic engineering. Going beyond this, to bring about improvement in normal people is by contrast positive engineering. This discussion explores that genetic disorder causes problems to individuals in terms of sickness or diseases like autism, diabetes and cystic fibrosis. These genetic diseases can be cured by gene therapy or by negative gene engineering. The principle behind negative genetic engineering is that a virus which is non-virulent or non-pathogenic will serve as a delivery system to insert a piece of DNA into the cell of the individual person with genetic disorder. The process is deemed successful when the modified cells divide normally to produce cells that express the trait that was missing before the individual person received the copy of that gene. This gene therapy provide good outlook at treating other maladies that are menacing many of our people with genetic disorder. While negative genetic engineering removes genetic disorders, positive genetic engineering enhances human. The latter makes those who are already healthy superior to the average. It makes people stronger, faster, smar ter. It enhances intelligence, stamina and physical attributes; it increases immunity of people to diseases caused by viruses. These changes can easily be attained when sex cells are the ones engineered during the critical period of the union between the egg and sperm cells. These changes are inheritable in all succeeding generations, posing permanent alterations of the human kind. Moral Implications of Genetic Engineering "If we produce a group of people who turn out worse than expected, we will have to live with them[...] The possibility of an irreversible disaster is a strong deterrent. It is enough to make some people think we should rule out genetic engineering altogether, and to make others think that, while negative engineering is perhaps acceptable, we should rule out positive engineering." (p.193) The above-mentioned quotes implies that "the benefits from negative engineering are clearer and that because its aims are more modest, disastrous mistakes are less likely." (p.193) Positive genetic engineering seemed immoral and unethical when one of its potential products is a

Planning and visualization (civil engineering ) Assignment

Planning and visualization (civil engineering ) - Assignment Example developing a project using As Late as Possible (ALAP) method will make all the tasks critical tasks and hence include all tasks in the project’s critical path. In essence, this method implies that all tasks will be sent to start at a date that will not affect the dependent task but will also not leave any room for delays. For every task, the late start date is the last date the project is expected to be ready, less the duration the task is expected to complete in order to be ready. Resource leveling often involves consideration of predecessors and successors as well as a number of other constraints. Consequently, when unskilled resources are insufficient to allow start of task at its LST, a delay beyond LST may be warranted. This ensures that the existing resources are used within the task without the need for either over-allocation, or extra expenditure on unskilled labor. In essence, these delays will lead to outright extension of the project’s duration. However, where the last start date is calculated as the latest possible date for the task’s start where all its successors and predecessors are also started and ended of their last start and end dates, the project end date may remain unaltered. However, for fixed task duration, where a successor task experiences delay, the delay is fa ctored into a date in LST. Task scheduling involves resource leveling process which is helpful in resolution of the problem of resource over-allocation by delaying tasks until the assigned resources becomes available to work on it. In the absence of resource leveling, plan schedule is accomplished using information such as task plan dates, as well as constraints and dependencies of individual task items. Resource leveling introduces the question of resource availability in calculation of time. Organization benefits from avoidance of conflicts and untimely delivery. Consequently, resource leveling is a very important process. Over-allocation of resources is a major cause of

Analytical Chafetz & Nelson and Toomeys essays Essay

Analytical Chafetz & Nelson and Toomeys essays - Essay Example Morris E. Chafetz, in â€Å"The 21-Year-Old Drinking Age: I Voted for it; It Doesnt Work,† and Toben F. Nelson, and Traci L. Toomey, in â€Å"The Drinking Age of 21 Saves Lives,† adopt opposing views on this issue. Chafetz argues that the MLDA of 21 â€Å"has not worked,† and is not linked to reduced drunk-driving fatalities (7). He holds that enforcing a minimum legal age for drinking does not take into consideration the deaths caused by alcohol off the highways, and drives teenagers to binge drinking in unsupervised surroundings. On the other hand, Nelson and Toomey take the position that the MLDA of 21 has reduced drinking-related deaths, and decreased binge-drinking in underage college students. Although both authors have credibility and are knowledgeable and logical about the subject, and Chafetz is more accommodating of opposing viewpoints, Nelson and Toomey make a more convincing argument as their stand is supported by extensive references to research stud ies. Both the essays are authored by writers with impeccable credentials. Chafetz is a credible speaker in the MLDA debate, as he is the founder of the National Institute for Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse and The Health Education Foundation in Washington. His reputation is further bolstered by the fact that he was a member of the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving, Director and Executive Member of the National Commission against Drunk Driving and the Presidential appointee at The White House Conference for a Drug-Free America. He is also a Doctor of Psychiatry, with a long history of association with social issues, such as alcoholism and drug abuse. Chafetz’s credentials are more than matched by Nelson and Toomey, who belong to the University of Minnesota’s School of Public Health. Their argument is further supported by a group of academicians and researchers. The reputation of the writers contributes to the trustworthiness of the essays and makes them both credible. Similarly, both the essays

The Cold Equations, Eureka. Reflection Journal from Stories Essay

The Cold Equations, Eureka. Reflection Journal from Stories - Essay Example If she could learn enough very quickly to land the ship and he went out the airlock it would not be believable and rather stupidly maudlin. I think the story only works, because it has no solution. In order to change the ending of this story you have to change the entire story. Maybe you could add the parents suing the company and the court proceedings against the pilot and the company, especially for the unlocked door. Even then it would be really difficult, because the story is really over when Marilyn goes out the airlock. Even if we begin with the lawsuit and flash back it just would not be a good story. However, after days of thought I decided that science of the future to the story might be able to do something. So, I have tried a changed ending. I still think the first ending is far superior and I would never publish a story with this ending, but I tried. Marylyn Said, â€Å"I’m ready,† but before Barton could press the button to open the airlock the radio crackled to life. â€Å"EDS, urgent, take not action. There is a solution.† Barton jumped to the console. â€Å"This is Barton, say again.† â€Å"This is Group One. We just got a message fr om Earth. There is a solution built into every EDS. It is horribly expensive, so it has never been revealed or used that we know. I mean nobody

Longitudinal Data Analysis Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3500 words

Longitudinal Data Analysis - Essay Example Since, the data is of longitudinal nature therefore it would be appropriate to use weighted data for adjusting unweighted data over the period of consideration. Weighting of individual data has been made for non-response of individuals within households i.e. same individuals were missing to participate in later waves of data collection. Individuals’ response data weights have been collected for 12 years from a variable – xLRWGHT included in the data set. Selection of Variables In order to study the relationship between educational qualifications and income levels of individuals the following variables have been identified and selected from BHPS dataset. Dependent Variable: The dependent variable selected for the study is the financial position of individuals. The associated variable from the dataset is ‘xfisit’ from BHPS dataset for 12 waves of data collected. Independent Variable (Covariate): The independent variable selected for the study is the highest e ducation qualification. The associated variable from the dataset is ‘xiqfedhi’ from BHPS dataset for 12 waves of data collected. Fixed Variable: The analysis is performed on the basis of ethnic background of individuals. For this purpose, variable ‘arace’ has been selected which is described as ethnic group membership. There are nine subsets under this variable including White, Black-Carib, Black-African, Black-Others, Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Bangladeshi, and Other Ethnic Groups. Hypotheses Establishment: In this study the relationship between education qualifications and financial position of individuals over a period of 12 years is investigated for testing out the following research hypothesis: H0: There is... The independent variable selected for the study is the highest education qualification. The associated variable from the dataset is ‘xiqfedhi’ from BHPS dataset for 12 waves of data collected. Fixed Variable: The analysis is performed on the basis of ethnic background of individuals. For this purpose, variable ‘arace’ has been selected which is described as ethnic group membership. There are nine subsets under this variable including White, Black-Carib, Black-African, Black-Others, Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Bangladeshi, and Other Ethnic Groups. Hypotheses Establishment: In this study the relationship between education qualifications and financial position of individuals over a period of 12 years is investigated for testing out the following research hypothesis: H0: There is no significant relationship between educational qualifications and financial position amongst individuals from different ethnic backgrounds. H1: There is a significant relation between educational qualifications and financial position individuals from different ethnic backgrounds. Methodology: The methodology that has been adopted for the current study is aimed at providing a detailed examination of the data that has been collected through BHSP for providing vital information regarding education qualifications and financial position recorded amongst individuals belonging to different ethnic backgrounds. This is carried out using Explore and Cross Tab options available in SPSS for descriptive statistics.

Social Darwinism Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1750 words

Social Darwinism - Essay Example â€Å"Social Darwinism† is a term used to refer to the application of ideas and concepts applied to the social world which are allegedly derived from Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution (Leonard, 2009). There is much controversy surrounding Social Darwinism, its historical significance, its usage and applicability and most importantly its association with some of the known social scientist in history such as Darwin and Spencer. The debate around the definition of the term has in most cases revolved around whether or not Social Darwinism came out of the works of Darwin and other theorists that wrote about the role of biology to explain the social hierarchies present during that era, as Europe, America and other continents witnessed the aftermath of industrialization. There are basically two types of approaches to the definition of the term that have been put forward to explain the different approaches theorists have taken in order to explain the term (Crook, 1996). The â€Å"generalist† approach basically refers to Social Darwinism as the analysis of social inequality by the help of evolutionary and developmental ideas using Darwinian terminologies such as â€Å"survival of the fittest† but not explicitly relying on the original works of Darwin (Weiler). The second type known as the â€Å"restrictionist† approach in contrast, argues that a mere use of phrases that represent the work of a theorist such as â€Å"survival of fittest† does not define the theorist as a Social Darwinist (Weiler). According to the broad definition, the theory came to denote racism, imperialism and capitalism during what came to be known as the Gilded Age where, whilst the poor suffered the consequences of Industrialization in the American society, those that owned the factories and benefited from the wealth they were acquiring, although fewer in number, used Social Darwinism to justify why such notions as â€Å"survival of the fittest† put forward by Darwin and Spencer made it logical for only those that were biologically gifted or a so called â€Å"superior race† to be market leaders and worthy of acquiring the most wealth and superior positions in politics (Hodgson 2004). There is also debate on when the term was first used and while the works of theorists like Hofstadter gave a strict definition of who the Social Darwinist are, others such as Hodgson have argued that these theorists present as facts what are basically just labels (Hodgson 2004). The history of the term is a controversial issue. While some say that the term was first used in the late 1800s and was associated with known social theorists like Spencer and Sumner (Wieler), for example Spencer’s Synthetic Philosophy is one of the first pieces of literature where the term can be traced (Hodgson 2004), others argue that Spencer never used the term Social Darwinism and that he is deemed one of the founders of the theory only based on assoc iations made between the theory and Spencer’s work (Hodgson, 2004). This paper will aim to present a critique of the theory â€Å"Social Darwinism† as presented in the book â€Å"Social Darwinism in American Thought† by Hofstadter that proved to be a very influential piece on the theory. In order to do so I will look at the work of revisionists such as Hodgson and Leonard who

Case study for The David Beckham Brand Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3000 words

Case study for The David Beckham Brand - Essay Example Beckham, married to ex-member of the pop group Spice Girls’ Victoria Adams, became one of the most popular celebrity couples of the time. They were admired by a tremendously large number of fans and were considered as fashion icons for youth. Beckham’s most popular endorsements include Pepsi, Vodafone, Nike, Brylcreem and Marks and Spencer. According to (HUNTER, 2009, p34-36) the value of Beckham’s brand was estimated to be over 200 million pounds. Great hype in media was created when Beckham got shifted from Manchester United to Real Madrid in 2003. However, this transfer was basically because of his commercial appeal instead of his game skills. In the following document we will analyse the reasons for successful endorsements by Beckham, the values and the principles which were followed in the endorsements and which led to those tremendous successes. Besides, the advantages and the disadvantages will be discussed that companies obtain from these endorsements. The case of Real Madrid will be analysed deeply and discussed in a separate section followed by the concept of celebrity endorsements in general and the benefits that can be achieved by celebrity endorsements by a company. There are generally three reasons for a customer to buy an endorsed product or service which are: quality of the product of service, quantity and price of the product or service and thirdly because of the endorser. David Beckham was sought for a large number of product or service endorsements in the late 90s era and the beginning of 21st century. He was undoubtedly one of the most successful endorsers of that era and the reasons of his success were many. He was not only a stylish soccer player but his popularity was increased due to his marriage with a famous pop star Victoria of former music band Spice Girls. His good looks, pleasant personality and his outclass performance in soccer had made him a style icon for not only the youth but

In the name of the father Essay Example for Free

In the name of the father Essay Often a film conveys a message about a character through various film techniques. This is true in the film â€Å"In The Name of the Father†. This story is mainly about a young man who is arrested for a crime he did not commit and how a relationship between father and son deepens throughout the tragedy. The main character, Gerry Conlon, is first portrayed to the viewer as an unruly rebel but is later developed into a more docile and compliant character. The director, Jim Sheridon, uses film techniques such as costume design, dialogue and extended metaphors to convey the development of Gerry as a character. 1st paragraph: -1st time we see gerry, scruffy, uncut -costume design baggy jeans, long hair, dirty appearance -gives idea that gerry doesn’t care about his appearance or what people think of him -as film progresses he sharpens up appearance -combed pulled back hair 2nd: -change also shown through dialogue -lawyer asks him if he is scared of the court: -he replies â€Å"i just don’t want to be humiliated again† -this brief piece of dialogue shows that he has now changed and does care what others think of him -helps viewer understand how desperate an innocent man can be in the fight for justice 3rd: -use of extended metaphor -viewer sees lawyer gareth pierce driving through a long tunnel while listening to gerrys story -this could be viewed as an extended metaphor for the long dark road gerry has gone down while fighting the legal system -as the story draws to a conclusion she reaches the end of the tunnel, or the ‘light at the end of the tunnel’ -could refer to the point in the story where gerry and the others are finally set free. Read more:  My Father Goes to Court by Carlos Bulosan

Depository System In India Security System For Investors Economics Essay

Depository System In India Security System For Investors Economics Essay Close to sixty three years of Independence, India has emerged to be one of the driving forces of the World Economy. However, with the recent setback of the Global Recession of 2007, a need had been felt to look into the existing structures of the Financial Institutions present. Consequently, a Committee was established by Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), under the chairmanship of Bimal Jalan, former Reserve Bank of India (RBI) governor, in February 2010. It was setup with the view to underscore an important distinction between regulation and control, and to ensure that the former does not degenerate into the latter. The committee has also instituted an interesting term called the Market Infrastructure Institutions. The term marker infrastructure denotes such fundamental facilities and systems serving the market. As per the Report  [1]  , Stock exchanges, depositories and clearing corporations are collectively referred to as securities Market Infrastructure Institutions (MIIs). They can be defined to be institutions providing basic, underlying framework or features for the market. Well functioning MIIs are the backbone of any economy, which in turn is directly proportional to the well-being of the economy. Infrastructure Institutions can be characterized by provision of essential services, offering networking services, exhibiting economies of scale, presenting sunk costs and operating natural monopolies.  [2]   Introduction Depositories form an important part of the securities Market Infrastructure Institutions in India. As per section 2(e) of the Depositories Act, 1996, a depository means a company formed and registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and which has been granted a Certificate of Registration under sub-section (1A) of section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (15 of 1992). In simple words, a Depository is an organization which is similar to a bank. It holds the securities of investors in an electronic book entry form at their request and provides services related to transactions in securities with speed, accuracy and safety. It interacts with its clients through a `Depository Participant with whom the client is required to open a Demat Account. A depository participant is defined in section 2(g) of the Depositories Act, 1996 as participant means a person registered as such under sub-section (1A) of section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (15 of 1992). An application for the grant of certificate of registration as Depository Participant is made to the Board Form E along with application fee as specified in Part A of the second schedule of the Depository Participant Regulations. Public financial  institutions, scheduled commercial banks,  foreign banks operating in India with the approval of the Reserve Bank of India, state financial corporations,  custodians, stock-brokers, clearing corporations /clearing houses, NBFCs and Registrar to an Issue or Share Transfer Agent complying with the requirements prescribed by SEBI can be registered as Depository Participants. Evolution of Depository System in India The growth in the Indian capital market both in number of transactions and the value of trade and resultant settlement of securities exposed the limitation of handling securities in the paper mode. Physical (paper) mode of holding securities was not only cumbersome and inefficient but also held numerous risks for the participant and led to dissatisfaction of issuers and investors alike. Due to limitations and problems associated it necessitated the setting up of depositories to move away from paper based holding of securities. Thus, Depository system was established to eliminate the inconvenience and confusion caused by the paper based trading and a scripless trading system came to be recognized. The enactment of Depositories Act in August 1996 paved the way for introduction of Depository system in India. Following the notification of the SEBI (Depositories and Participants) Regulations, 1996, National Securities Depository Ltd (NSDL), a company sponsored by the NSE, IDBI and UTI was granted a certificate of registration as a depository on June 7,1996. Some of the other shareholders are State Bank of India, HDFC Bank Limited, Deutsche Bank A.G., Axis Bank Limited, Citibank N.A.Standard Chartered Bank, The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited, Oriental Bank of Commerce etc. The higher shareholding (of at least 51%) by sponsors, including stock exchanges in depositories was permitted in the initial stages for facilitating the setting up of depositories. Central Depository Services (India) Ltd (CDSL), the second depository, was promoted by Bombay Stock Exchange Limited (BSE) in association with Bank of India, Bank of Baroda, State Bank of India and HDFC Bank. BSE has been involved with this venture right from the inception and has contributed overwhelmingly to the fruition of the project. The initial capital of the company is Rs.104.50 crores. The list of major shareholders with effect from 5th July, 2010 is  [3]  : Name of shareholders Value of holding (in Rupees Lacs) % Terms to total equity Bombay Stock Exchange Limited 5,663.46 54.20 Bank of India 582.00 5.57 Bank of Baroda 530.00 5.07 State Bank of India 1,000.00 9.57 HDFC Bank Limited 750.00 7.18 Standard Chartered Bank 750.00 7.18 Canara Bank 674.46 6.45 Inter-depository transfer through on-line connectivity between CDSL and NSDL was established in 1999.  [4]   Benefits of the Depository System The main objective of the depository system is to maintain and safeguard the ownership and transfer records of securities in an electronic form. Depository system eliminates the inconvenience and confusion caused by the paper based trading. It is a safe and convenient way of holding securities and reduces the risks associated with certificates. In a depository system, the investors have the advantages like efficient settlements, lower costs and lower risks of theft. It also facilitates immediate transfer of securities and no stamp duty is required on transfer of shares. Change in address recorded with Depository Participant gets registered with all companies in which investor holds securities electronically eliminating the need to correspond with each of them separately. Also there is automatic credit into demat account of shares, arising out of bonus/split/consolidation/merger etc.A natural guardian is not required to take court approval for selling Demat securities on behalf of a minor. Ease in portfolio monitoring  since statement of account gives a consolidated position of investments in all instruments. Holding investments in equity and debt instruments in a single  account is also another advantage of the depository system. Features of Indian Depository System: Dematerialization: There are two models for depository system across the world-dematerialization and immobilization. India has adopted the dematerialization model. India provides for a competitive multi-depository system. There can be various entities providing depository services.eg (NSDL and CDSL).The model adopted in India provides only for Dematerialization of securities. Dematerialization is the process of converting the physical form of shares into an electronic form and in short called Demat. Dematerialization of securities occurs when securities issued in physical form is destroyed and an equivalent number of securities are credited into the beneficiary owners account. The depositories can provide their services to investors through their agents called Depository Participants. These agents are appointed subject to the conditions prescribed under Securities and Exchange Board of India (Depositories and Participants) Regulations,1996 and other applicable conditions. The participants and investors get their respective IDs which has a unique identification in the depository system. Any number of depository accounts can be opened. After opening an account with the Depository Participant the investor should surrender the physical certificates held in his name to a depository participant. These certificates will be sent to the respective companies where they will be cancelled after dematerialization and will credit the investors account with the Depository Participant. The securities on dematerialization will appear as balances in the depository account. These balances can be transferred like the shares held in physical form. The securities in the Demat can again be converted into physical form which is called as dematerialization. Dematerialization of shares is optional and the investor can hold shares in the physical form, however the investor will have to demat the shares if he wishes to sell or purchase the shares through stock exchanges. Immobilization of securities is done by storing or lodging the physical security certificates with an organization that acts as a custodian a securities depository. All subsequent transactions in such immobilized securities take place through book entries. The actual owners have the right to withdraw the physical securities from the custodial agent whenever required by them. In the case of IPO, a jumbo certificate is issued in the name of the beneficiary owners based on which the depository gives credit to the account of beneficiary owners. Fungibility: Section 9 of the Depositories Act, 1996 states that securities in depositories should be in fungible form. In the depository system, the securities dematerialized are not identified by distinctive numbers or certificate numbers as in the physical environment. Thus all securities in the same class are identical and interchangeable. For example, all equity shares in the class of fully paid up shares are interchangeable. Registered Owner/ Beneficial Owner: In the depository system, the ownership of securities dematerialized is bifurcated between Registered Owner and Beneficial Owner. For the securities dematerialized, NSDL is the Registered Owner in the books of the issuer, but ownership rights and liabilities rest with Beneficial Owner. All the rights, duties and liabilities underlying the security are on the beneficial owner of the security. Free Transferability of shares: Transfer of shares held in dematerialized form takes place freely through electronic book-entry system. Legal Framework The depository business in India is regulated by: a. The Depositories Act, 1996 It was enacted to provide for regulation of depositories  in securities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. It came into force from 20th September, 1995. It provides for the establishment of single and multiple depositories. Anybody to be eligible needs to be formed and registered as a company under the Companies Act, 1956 and seek registration with SEBI and obtain a Certificate of Commencement of Business from SEBI on fulfillment of the prescribed conditions. b. The SEBI (Depositories and Participants) Regulations, 1996 SEBI on 6th May, 1996 issued SEBI (Depositories and Participants) Regulations, 1996 which apply to depositories and its participants. The Depositories Act requires that the registration of the depository, depository participant and custodian, is mandatory with SEBI.  [5]  These regulations also contain provisions for operations and functioning of depositories, for application and certificates used and schedule of fees for participants etc. c. Bye-Laws of Depository Depository is required to frame its bye-laws  [6]  with the prior approval of SEBI, consistent with the provisions of the Act and the regulations made by SEBI thereunder. However on non-compliance SEBI has the power to amend or revoke the bye-laws on its own. d. Other Laws Apart from the above, Depositories are also governed by certain provisions of Companies Act, 1956, The Indian Stamp Act, 1899, SEBI Act,1956, SCRA,1956, Benami Transaction Prohibition Act,1988, Income Tax Act,1961, Bankers Book Evidence Act,1891. Ownership Norms Setting up of a Depository: An application for the grant of a certificate of registration as a depository shall be made to the Board by the sponsor in Form A. A Sponsor (anchor investor), as per section 2 (g), SEBI (Depositories and Participants) Regulations, 1996, means any person or persons who, acting alone or in combination with another proposes to establish a depository and undertakes to perform the obligations of a sponsor under these regulations. It is to be accompanied by the fee  [7]  and be paid in the manner specified thereof.  [8]   The application should be accompanied by draft bye-laws of the depository that is proposed to be set up. The sponsor is to be from one of the mentioned categories: (i) A public financial institution as defined in section 4A of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956); (ii) A bank included for the time being in the Second Schedule to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (2 of 1934); (iii) A foreign bank operating in India with the approval of the Reserve Bank of India; (iv) A recognized stock exchange within the meaning of clause (j) of section 2 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (42 of 1956); (v) A body corporate engaged in providing financial services where not less than seventy-five per cent of the equity capital is held by any of Securities and Exchange Board of India the institutions mentioned in sub-clause (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) jointly or severally; (vi) A body corporate constituted or recognized under any law for the time being in force in a foreign country for providing custodial, clearing or settlement services in the securities market and approved by the Central Government; (vii) An institution engaged in providing financial services established outside India and approved by the Central Government; The applicant is supposed to be a fit and proper person.  [9]   Presently, sponsors are required to hold at least 51% of the equity share capital in the depository, either alone or together.  [10]  Also, no participant shall at any time, hold more than 5% of the equity capital of the depository  [11]   No person other than a sponsor, whether resident in India, or not, shall at any time, either individually or together with persons acting in concert, hold more than 5% of the equity share capital in the depository.  [12]   The expression person resident in India shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (v) of section 2 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (42 of 1999). The expression Persons acting in concert shall have the meaning derived from clause (e) of sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 2 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997. The combined holding of all persons resident outside India in the equity share capital of the depository shall not exceed, at any time, 49% of its total equity share capital, subject further to the following: the sponsor shall, at all times, hold at least 51% of the equity capital of the depository and the balance of the equity capital of the depository shall be held by its participants.  [13]   At present, the combined holding of all persons residing outside India in the equity share capital of an MII is capped at 49% subject to the following: The combined holding through FDI  [14]  and FII  [15]  routes are capped at 26% and 23%, respectively. FIIs can acquire the equity shares of an MII only through the secondary market.  [16]   An FII cannot have representation on the board of an MII.  [17]   After considering the application, if the Board is satisfied that the company established by the sponsor is eligible to act as a depository it may grant a certificate of registration in Form B to the depository subject to the prescribed conditions like registration fee, redressing of grievances etc. A depository is required to make an application to the Board for commencement of business in Form C within one year from the date of issue of certificate of registration. The SEBI (Depositories and Participants) Regulations, 1996, provides that: the depository shall not carry on any activity other than that of a depository unless the activity is incidental to the activity of the depository  [18]   It is provided that a depository may carry out such activity not incidental to its activities as a depository, as may be assigned to the depository, by the Central Government or by a regulator in the financial sector, through the establishment of Strategic Business Unit(s), and by complying with other conditions specified by the Board.  [19]   A Strategic Business Unit shall be an organizational unit of a company with its own mission, objectives and business strategy that is given the responsibility to serve the particular demands of one business area with appropriate technological, financial and other segregations. It is provided that for the purposes of clause (d) and (e) no foreign entity,  [20]  individually and collectively either as a sponsor or as a participant or as a sponsor and participant together shall hold more than 20% of the equity capital of a depository. Board Composition The Board composition for the two main depositories in India can be summarized as follows: a. National Securities Depository Ltd (NSDL) Independent Directors: 5 Shareholder Directors: 5 MD/CEO: 1 b. Central Depository Services (India) Ltd (CDSL) Independent Directors: 2 Shareholder Directors: 5 Whole time Directors: 1 The board structure for depositories is not subject to stringent norms. Only financial institutions/banks/stock exchanges, etc. can be sponsors of a depository and these are mostly nominated as shareholder directors. Further there have been no requirements for appointment of MD/CEO that have been prescribed for depositories. Net Worth of Depositories The net worth requirement for Depositories is 100 crores. Disadvantages: Prior to dematerialization there was almost a gap of three months between application date and listing of shares. Dematerialization has reduced this gap to a great extent. Current regulations prohibit multiple bids or applications by a single person. But the investors open multiple demat accounts and make multiple applications to subscribe to IPOs in the hope of getting allotment. The recent IPO allotment scam proves that even a highly automated system is not the solution to prevent malpractices, if there is laxity. The scam of Yes bank and IDFC reveal the defect that investor banker fail to weed out multiple applications either direct or benami.eg. In the Yes Bank scandal thirteen investors had manipulated the allotment of shares by opening 7500 benami accounts and made profit in 1.7crores. Eventually all the thirteen investors were banned from trading in bank shares immediately. Lack of coordination between banks, DPs, brokers depositories, registrars and investment bankers and clarity of their roles has given rise to such problems. The depository system is complex and in need of greater supervision and control. Thus is the working of the Depository system in India. The advantages of the depository system outweigh the disadvantages. Few changes in the complex system and specifications regarding the appointment of Board of directors need to be specified.

Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia

Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia Chapter Six Lessons and Implications The changes in Indonesia have been incrementalWe still have the New Order, or most of it. Anyway, the corrosive parts are still reigning in. We have a new administration but the New Order keeps coming back in various ways. Dwight T. King[1] It is a paradox that, in an era when democracy seems to have emerged as the single most acceptable form of political organization, more and more people in both mature and young democracies are disengaging from the political process. Knight, Chigudu Tandon (2002) †¦a breakdown of an authoritarian regime may be reversed†¦even if democracy is established, it need not be consolidated. Under certain conditions, democratic institutions may systematically generate outcomes that cause some politically important forces to opt for authoritarianism. Hence, consolidated democracy is only one among the possible outcomes of breakdown of authoritarian regimes. Pzeworski (1991: 51) Introduction The discussion in previous chapters provides a foundation for important theoretical insights regarding the nature and the significance of decentralization in Indonesia, as well as its relation to democratization in the regions. I have emphasized how decentralization practices in the regions promote popular participation in local political processes beyond electoral participation. By and large, the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon in implementing decentralization between 1945 and 2006 lend support to the argument that decentralization does not necessarily lead to the growth of local democracy within which local ordinary people are able to exert their power to significantly influence local decision-making process. Although promoting democracy has become one of the stated goals of several decentralization laws, their enforcement in both regions has not promoted meaningful inclusion of local ordinary people in local political processes beyond electoral participation. In fact, it has been the weakest point of decentralization practices in both regions. Overall, the two case studies share a similar theme, namely that power remains actually concentrated in the hands of local elites and hence, local communities are constantly marginalized. Against this backdrop, in this chapter, I will examine a number of factors which have circumscribed the democr atic potential of the decentralization program in Indonesia. Based on the experiences of a variety of countries, some theorists suggest that successful decentralization policies are contingent upon certain individual or collective prerequisites. These include: a high degree of central state capacity, a well developed civil society, strong political will among national as well as local political elites, strong social support, a long experience of democracy, a well-established multi-party system, strong enabling legal frameworks, and a culture of accountability, etc (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Crook Manor 1995: 327; Ardaya Thevoz 2001: 220; Heller 2001: 138-139). Regarding this assertion, analysts also emphasize that the extent to which these conditions work varies across countries. This means that some conditions work relatively well in certain countries, but in others they do not effectively facilitate the stated goals of decentralization policies (Kulipossa 2004: 771). In addition, Smoke (2003: 12) and Kulipossa (2004: 772 ) also draw attention to the fact that there are cases where decentralization can achieve its potential benefits in the absence of those conditions, as well as cases where most of those prerequisites are in place, but decentralization has been undermined. Against the above line of thought, I would argue here that to a certain extent, the unfulfilled democratic potential of decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon can also be associated with the absence of some of the above favourable conditions. These include weak political will among both national and local political authorities, the absence of a vibrant civil society, and the lack of an attentive public. Needless to say, these factors vary across time and regimes. Above all, the absence of these favourable conditions for fulfilling the democratic potential of decentralization appears to result from three aspects: first, all along, decentralization in Indonesia has been perceived and embraced by Indonesian political elites mainly as a matter of political strategy; second, the long-standing authoritarian system of government; and third, the primacy of pragmatic over political decentralization approach, both normatively and empirically. Decentralization in Indonesia: a matter of regimes political strategy? Among the most important factors which determines the design and the actual practices of decentralization and in turn, its expected consequences (e.g., improving public service delivery, maintaining national integration and promoting local democracy) is the motivation of key actors in adopting the policy in the first place (Selee Tulchin 2004). The experiences of many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for instance, attest that the motives of politicians that embrace decentralization policies are not necessarily as virtuous as those who design them. In fact, Smoke and Gomez (2006 : 351; see also, for example, Eaton 2001a; Shah Thompson 2004: 3-4) observe that despite the efficiency and good governance rhetoric surrounding decentralization, the underlying impetus has been inherently political, meaning that the adoption of decentralization has been linked to central governments desire to accomplish their own particular political interests. The factors underlying political interest are country and regime specific. They include, for instance, shoring up their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens usually amidst national political crisis, competition with rival political parties for popular support, pressure from subnational governments for more powers, and opportunity for a ruling party to consolidate power (Selee Tulchin 2004: 299-302; Smoke Gomez 2006 : 351). Many observers believe that these kinds of political motives have partly accounted for the failure of decentralization practices in many developing countries to deliver its democratic potential (Eaton 2001a; Friedman Kihato 2004; Oxhorn 2004). Indonesias decentralization experience is not an exception to the above phenomenon. Although promoting democratization has been one of the stated goals of Indonesias decentralization programs, there has been significant gap between rhetoric and reality. The continuous marginalization of local people from local political processes has been partly rooted in the ‘undemocratic political motives of both national and local political elites in adopting and implementing decentralization policy. As explained in Chapter Three, decentralization in Indonesia has never been constructed in a political vacuum. Hence, I would argue that the degree, pattern and process of decentralization has been strongly influenced by, borrowing Montero and Samuels term (2004: 5), political determinants, i.e., regime responses to changing conditions and incentives within the context of rapid political and economic changes. During the revolution era, decentralization policies recognized the principle of extensive autonomy in all regions of the newly independent Republic. However, such policies were actually constructed by national political elites as a means of establishing and maintaining national authority over many already operating local governments in those regions previously occupied by the colonial government. The polices were also constructed to fulfill other political ends, namely to gain international recognition, as contained in both Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 in the face of Dutch accusations that Indonesia was a puppet state of the Japanese. Thus, despite official claims that decentralization was embraced as an indispensable strategy in materializing a democratic system due to the countrys size and diverse characteristics, the embrace of the policy during this period was not genuinely related to the intention of developing meaningful democratic system within the country since those two basic laws were not followed by any clear operational directions whatsoever on how a democratic system of government would be crafted on the ground. This claim is underscored by the fact that there was no significant alteration in terms of local political processes in Bandung, Cirebon or other regions in the country. As Maryanov (1958: 9) also observed, Many of the institutions and practices adopted or utilized by independent Indonesia have been reflections of those established by the Netherlands East Indies†¦alterations in governmental structure turned out to be minor†¦patterns of administrative behavior remained rooted in the Dutch traditional procedures. Accordingly, the experiences of both Bandung and Cirebon during post-independence until mid 1950s revealed that, except for the establishment of local government structures, the enforcement of Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 allowed neither effective decentralization nor democratization in the regions. Needless to say, the political situation during revolutionary era also contributed to the limited enforcement of the policies in the regions. By the same token, there were three decisive political factors which led national political elites to adopt advanced decentralization policy as contained in Law No. 1 of 1957 which â€Å"greatly increased the power of elected legislative councils in the provinces, regencies, and municipalities† and set for wider regional authority vis-à  -vis the central government (Feith 1962: 552). These factors were, first, a kind of political promise by the government of Republic of Indonesia to the former constituent states of the Republic of the United States of Indonesiaà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢a federal structure created by the Dutchà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢ when they voluntarily decided to join the Republic of Indonesia to establish the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the electoral calculations of various political parties in the Constituent Assembly to have wider mass bases in the regions and to play more influential roles in regional politics. And third, forestalling regional rebellions rooted in growing regional dissatisfaction concerning the central governments unfulfilled promises to carry out development. This was intertwined with other issues such as ethnic tension, economic imbalance and political rivalry between politicians in Java and the Outer Islands. Accordingly, most of the advanced provisions within Law No. 1 were considered to be immediate responses to the above political factors, such as the recognition of the principle of extensive autonomy which was applied based on the capacity of respective local governments and the election of heads of regions by the DPRDs. In addition, the direct election of members of the DPRD and the issuance of Indonesias first Fiscal Balance Law within the same year were also seen as inseparable efforts by national political elites to respond to those political factors. In turn, however, similar to its predecessors, such pragmatic and short term political calculations by national political elites prevented decentralization achieving its idealized outcomes. As Bandung and Cirebons experiences attest, until late 1950s, there was relatively little effective power actually decentralized. In addition, one might conclude that with the introduction of direct election of DPRD members and the election of head of region by the DPRD, local democracy was being crafted on the ground. However, it was not accompanied by channels of popular participation beyond the election. Recapping the above political motives in adopting such advances provisions in Law No. 1, neither central government policy makers nor democratically elected local governments in either case study considered this issue as among their political goals. Accordingly, the two case studies demonstrate that the dynamic of political parties and decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon clearly d id not make local political process more open to participation by local people. Decentralization practices during the Sukarno and Suharto eras obviously confirm the argument that decentralization can be applied within authoritarian regime (Eaton 2001a: 3; Montero Samuels 2004: 10). These cases, however, it was by no means aimed at achieving the various virtues routinely discussed by democratization theorists, but rather at tightening their control over the apparatus of local government at all levels in order to facilitate an authoritarian system. This was particularly fulfilled by making both subnational executives and legislatures appointed and hence, accountable to the national authorities. Thus, these local apparatus were nothing but the instruments of central government with their main function representing the central governments interests in the regions. Yet again, such decentralization was not made in a political vacuum. Prior to the enforcement of Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 concerning Regional Government and Presidential Edict No. 5 of 1960 regarding the Gotong Royong Regional Representative Council and Regional Secretariat (Sekretaris Daerah), Indonesia was hit by escalating political turbulence due to the outbreak of rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the repeated collapse of governing coalitions at the national level in addition to the failure of the Constituent Assembly to make a replacement for the Provisional 1950 Constitution. In turn, these aspects triggered the issuance of a wave of government regulations by Sukarno intended to overhaul the system of government based on his personal concept of Guided Democracyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Ã¢â‚¬ a democracy with a leadership†(van der Kroef 1957: 115). This concept was believed to be an alternative to troublesome â€Å"Western concepts of parliamentary democracy† wh ich had supposedly led to the above political turbulence due to the weakness of government authority and the vehemence of political opposition (van der Kroef 1957: 113). Thus, the new arrangements in local governance were specifically aimed at facilitating Sukarnos own concept of Guided Democracy, which required a total subservience of local governments to central government policies. Sukarno himself was closely involved in setting in place local government institutions, such as heads of regions and local councils. Suharto did not loosen up central control when he took over from Sukarno following the abortive conspiracy by left-wing officers in 1965 until his demise in 1998 (Malley 1999: 75). In fact, severe economic and political crisis inherited from the previous regime contributed to the deepening of authoritarianism that fostered a highly centralized system of government. Suhartos regime believed that this mode of government could retain political and economic stability as its ultimate basis for overcoming the crisis. Another important determinant of Suhartos centralistic policy towards local government system was the need to establish and consolidate an effective government administration over the vast and diverse country (MacAndrews 1986: 27-30). In turn, these variables contributed to the centralistic nature of New Orders ‘decentralization law ¾Law No. 5 of 1974 concerning The Basic Principle of Government in the Regional Government through which â€Å"the regions had neither in fluence over national government policies nor the power to control their own affairs† (Aspinall Fealy 2003: 2). In essence, throughout Suhartos regime, local governments were mainly as implementers of various policies constructed and financially supported by the central government. Thus, both the Sukarno and Suharto regime indeed continued to adopt ‘decentralization policies as represented by the existence of the above law and regulations. However, all were intended to facilitate central government control and greater penetration of society in order to repress vehemence political opposition so that all central government policies and interests would be efficiently implemented down to the lowest level of governments without any resistance. Needless to say, such a mode of ‘decentralization provided no space for citizen participation. Many Indonesians had great hopes that the so-called ‘Big Bang approach to decentralization launched in 2001 would at last bring into reality the various potential benefits of the policy, including democratic local governance. However, various studies (e.g., Anggraini 2007; The Asia Foundation, 2002a; The Asia Foundation, 2002b; Wardana 2007) including two case studies discussed in previous chapters confirm that the decentralization practices have gone without meaningful opening up institutional spaces for greater citizen participation, even though, promoting local democratic governance was among the stated goals of the ‘Big Bang approach. Yet again, a key problem was that realizing democratic potential was not among the main goals of the national political elites when they adopted the policy. Rather, as explained in Chapter Three, the ‘Big Bang policy was motivated by a number of crucial political determinants that had little to do with developing local democracy or even with the neo-liberal agenda of achieving a more effective and efficient public service. These included forestalling national disintegration amidst the emergence of separatist movements and the vocal demands for more autonomy from some resource-rich regions (Sukma 2003: 65; Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271; Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17) ; restoring the legitimacy of the state as well as national elites following the collapse of Suhartos regime, severe economic crisis, and the loss of East Timor (Smoke Gomez 2006 : 353); transferring financial burdens from the center to the regions amidst dramatic decline of central governments financial capacity following t he economic crisis of 1997-1999 (Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271-272); and, no less important, electoral calculus of Habibies to garner the support of the regions prior to the presidential elections (Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17). It was for these strategic reasons, few of which were related to democracy, that the government was willing to embrace a radical approach to decentralization. Further consequence, as attested in Bandung District and City of Cirebon cases, neither clear and firm central governments policies or programs, nor local governance meaningfully accommodated the rhetoric of promoting democratization into reality. Although it was often argued that local democracy was strengthened through the significant empowerment of DPRD vis-à  -vis head of region (Rasyid 2003), this mechanism of political representation in fact could not deliver effective accomplishment of what Fung and Wright (2003: 3) called, the central ideas of democratic politics: facilitating active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that ground a productive economy and healthy society, and, in more radical egalitarian versions of the democratic ideal, assuring that all citizens benefit from the nations wealth. The enforcement of Indonesias latest decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢did not make local political processes more inclusive either, since the law was not motivated by the intention to so. On the surface, it might appear that the formulation of the law was driven by the intention of the Megawati administration to curb the emergence of various abuses of Law No. 22 of 1999, such as rampant corruption and blatant money politics, ethnic parochialism, and the proliferation of excessive taxes which had led to a high cost economy to name some of the most worrying signs. Many perceived that all of these problems were rooted in imperfect laws and the lack of a clearly designed plan (Turner et al. 2003; Legowo 2003; Legowo Djadijono n.d). More compelling is the argument that the attempt was a straightforward act of re-centralization. Such an act is particularly rooted in the nature of decentralization itself, which is not merely as an administrative business, but rather it involves the distributional struggles between national and subnational elites regarding control over local resources (Slater Watson 1989: 511; Montero 2001: 44-45; Hadiz 2003b: 123). Accordingly, meaningful decentralization always faces enormous political obstacles and can be subjected to serious setbacks. One of the salient challenges is the preference of national elites to slow down the process of decentralization and to reinforce their attempts to control it. As Eaton (2001b: 102) suggests, â€Å"national politicians can and do continue to use their legislative authority to modify the initial decision to decentralize†. Thus, for national politicians, â€Å"decentralization is neither inevitable nor irreversible† (Eaton 2001b: 101). I would suggest that the enforcement of the latest Indonesias decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢perfectly supports this line of argument. This contention is further strengthened by the fact that Law No. 32 restores and strengthens the province and the Ministry of Home Affairs positions in regional affairs at the expense of district governments authority (Eko 2005: 27-29; Ryaas Rashid as cited in Myala 2005). The only new provision within Law No. 32 of 2004 embraced by many as a significant leap in decentralization and local democratization efforts regarded the direct election of heads of regions However, as Fung and Wright argues (2003: 3), the election of both legislative and executive offices are not sufficient to accommodate the influence of local ordinary people on local political processes beyond the election. As the experiences of Bandung and Cirebon attest, there has not been any significant alteration in terms of developing inclusive local political process in the aftermath of the head of region elections. It must be admitted that the promulgation of Local Regulation on Transparency and Participation in Bandung District in 2004 was actually a progressive step in institutionalizing active political involvement of local people. However, it has not been effectively implemented yet. Lack of political will on the part of local to consistently implement the regulation has ensured that it has had only rhetorical value. The claim that popular participation has been channeled through the annual development planning process is specious, since the process is actually still strongly dominated by local government officers. New arrangements in local governance based on Law No. 32 have in fact significantly reduced the power of DPRDs vis-à  -vis heads of regions, since the former no longer have the power to elect and to hold the latter accountable, as regulated in the previous decentralization law. The head of region is now accountable to the central authorities with the president at the apex of the hierarchy. Thus, from a representative democracy point of view, there has been a significant retreat as well. Thus, the lesson seems to be that decentralization in Indonesia has been pursued mainly as a political strategy to fulfill certain political ends, particularly those of national elites within the context of political and economic crisis. Deepening democracy has never been the driving force behind decentralization reform. It is therefore no surprise that we find a lack of political will to realize the democratic potential of decentralization policies at any stage of Indonesias history. Smoke (2003: 12) points out that among the most ubiquitous claims regarding impediments to decentralizations success is the lack of strong political will from various stakeholders involved in the process. Theorists do not all mean the same thing when they talk about ‘political will. For some theorists, strong political will can be seen from the existence of constitutional or legal instruments made by political elites, both national and local (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Smoke 2003 : 12). Nevertheless, since many cases also show that decentralization policies cannot attain their intended goals,[2] theorists also emphasize that constitutional and legal instruments are not sufficient to ensure workable decentralization policies. As Isaac (2001: 9) firmly argues, Fundamental reforms cannot be merely legislated. Legislation remains empty phrases unless powerful movements oversee their implementation. Legislation is necessary but not sufficient for decentralization. Accordingly, as Rondinelli (1983: 198-200) highlights, political will must also be measured from the actual realization of those normative arrangements particularly by central political authorities transferring planning, decision-making and managerial authority to lower levels of governments, and also by local political authorities sharing their authority with local citizens through opening up effective channels for political participation so that local citizens, especially the poor and marginalized ones, are able to express their needs and demands and to press claims or national and local development resources. Thus, this dimension of political will is also essential, since in many cases, normative arrangements of decentralization are often used to facilitate political aims that have little to do with devolving power to lower level of governments and utilizing this power to effectively fulfill local peoples needs and demands. As Crook (2003: 85-86) stresses, in some African countrie s the real goal is often to consolidate power through political parties and local elites, or to deliberately neutralize local ethnic challenges through fragmenting â€Å"potential local power bases into smaller, weaker, politically insignificant units†. Based on the above line of thought, the lack of political will in pursuing the democratic potential of Indonesias decentralization can be viewed from different perspectives. Normatively, even though the embrace of the policy may initially be claimed to be an indispensable strategy to develop a democratic system of government, its subsequent adoption within constitutions and some existing decentralization laws as well as their operational regulations in the regions so far has never been clear, firm, and consistent. Neither constitutions nor basic legislation and its subsequent operational regulations explicitly note that promoting local democracy is among the intended goals of decentralization programs. During the New Order era, Development Planning (Perencanaan Pembangunan), which was regulated within the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation of 1982 (Permendagri No. 9/1982), was claimed to be adopting a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Empirically, however, as proven in the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon, the planning process was actually highly centralized and practically excluded public participation. The local governments development planning processes were nothing but breaking down the centrally planned parameters. One might find that this was not the case during the post-Suharto era, particularly with regard to Law No.22 of 1999 and Law No. 32 of 2004. Indeed, some argue that Law No. 22 in particular, was intended to promote local democracy and participation, as evident in its preamble: â€Å"in the implementation of Regional Autonomy is deemed to be necessary to emphasize more the principles of democracy, public participation, equal distribution and fairness, and considering the potential and regional diversity† (Turner et al. 2003: 23; see also, Jaya Dick 2001: 216). However, it appears that further details on how local democracy would be implemented on the ground were actually ill-defined. The national government in fact issued a separate regulation, i.e. Government Regulation No. 68 of 1999 regarding public participation in the governmental process.[3] From the title of the regulation, one might easily assume that it was regarding peoples involvement in the governments policy-making process. But, it was actually not. The regulation was actually more about peoples rights rather than facilitating popular participation. Four rights were mentioned: the right to obtain and give information regarding governmental process; the right to get fair service from the government; the right to give advice to the government policies; and the right to legal protection (perlindungan hukum).[4] Thus, the Government Regulation did not specifically mention that popular participation would be the essential component of the government policy-making process. In addition, knowing that popular participation was framed in terms of rights, it means that it was set on voluntary basis. I believe t hat such setting provided weak encouragement for the public to be engaged in governmental process. In the case of Law No. 32, its prologue reads, †¦local government, which manages and oversees its own governmental affairs based on the principles of decentralization and medebewind (co-operating administration) , is directed towards boosting people welfare through service improvement, empowerment, and popular participation, as well as improving regional competitiveness by taking into account the principles of democracy, equal distribution, fairness, specialness (keistimewaan), and specific characteristics (kekhususan) of a region within the system of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. From the above prologue, there would appear to be no significant difference between Law No. 22 and Law No. 32. However, one might argue that central government, as the main architect of the law, showed stronger political will to uphold local democracy in Law No. 32 rather than its predecessor, based on two novel articles within the law, i.e. Article 56 (1) regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government and Article 139 (1) which stated that â€Å"Local community has the right to provide input verbally or in writing for the preparation of or during the deliberation of a proposed bill.† Direct election of head and deputy head of local government is undeniably desirable since, as Peterson (1997: 14) argues, indirect elections have â€Å"tended to perpetuate the strength of political insiders, who are often more accountable to their party hierarchy than to the public at large†. Nevertheless, further analysis of other articles reveals that direct el ection of head and deputy head of local government actually lacked democratic orientation in three aspects: first, the election process was practically dominated by political parties maneuvers, especially during the selection of the candidates for head and deputy head of local government, which is prone to power abuse by ‘selling the office to the highest bidder; second, there was strong intervention from national political party boards in determining the candidates; and third, the election gave no opportunity for independent candidates (Legowo Djadijono n.d). Hence, in the end, local communities have become the last component in the whole series of the election process. In other words, the novel provisions regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government only left the local community marginalized. More importantly, direct election is insufficient for developing strong local democracy since â€Å"elections occur infrequently and allow for only limited citizen input or feedback regarding specific local concerns or policy options† (Posner 2004: 57). Strong local democracy, Posner argues, needs to be backed up by active political participation of local constituencies beyond the mere act of voting. With regard to Article 139 (1), it appears that popular participation was provided for on a voluntarily basis. What I am pointing out here is that the article indicates that popular participation in local policy making process was not an essential factor in the process. This point is underlined by the fact that there were no other provisions within Law No. 32 which obligated local government institutions to engage the local community meaningfully in the process. Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia Chapter Six Lessons and Implications The changes in Indonesia have been incrementalWe still have the New Order, or most of it. Anyway, the corrosive parts are still reigning in. We have a new administration but the New Order keeps coming back in various ways. Dwight T. King[1] It is a paradox that, in an era when democracy seems to have emerged as the single most acceptable form of political organization, more and more people in both mature and young democracies are disengaging from the political process. Knight, Chigudu Tandon (2002) †¦a breakdown of an authoritarian regime may be reversed†¦even if democracy is established, it need not be consolidated. Under certain conditions, democratic institutions may systematically generate outcomes that cause some politically important forces to opt for authoritarianism. Hence, consolidated democracy is only one among the possible outcomes of breakdown of authoritarian regimes. Pzeworski (1991: 51) Introduction The discussion in previous chapters provides a foundation for important theoretical insights regarding the nature and the significance of decentralization in Indonesia, as well as its relation to democratization in the regions. I have emphasized how decentralization practices in the regions promote popular participation in local political processes beyond electoral participation. By and large, the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon in implementing decentralization between 1945 and 2006 lend support to the argument that decentralization does not necessarily lead to the growth of local democracy within which local ordinary people are able to exert their power to significantly influence local decision-making process. Although promoting democracy has become one of the stated goals of several decentralization laws, their enforcement in both regions has not promoted meaningful inclusion of local ordinary people in local political processes beyond electoral participation. In fact, it has been the weakest point of decentralization practices in both regions. Overall, the two case studies share a similar theme, namely that power remains actually concentrated in the hands of local elites and hence, local communities are constantly marginalized. Against this backdrop, in this chapter, I will examine a number of factors which have circumscribed the democr atic potential of the decentralization program in Indonesia. Based on the experiences of a variety of countries, some theorists suggest that successful decentralization policies are contingent upon certain individual or collective prerequisites. These include: a high degree of central state capacity, a well developed civil society, strong political will among national as well as local political elites, strong social support, a long experience of democracy, a well-established multi-party system, strong enabling legal frameworks, and a culture of accountability, etc (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Crook Manor 1995: 327; Ardaya Thevoz 2001: 220; Heller 2001: 138-139). Regarding this assertion, analysts also emphasize that the extent to which these conditions work varies across countries. This means that some conditions work relatively well in certain countries, but in others they do not effectively facilitate the stated goals of decentralization policies (Kulipossa 2004: 771). In addition, Smoke (2003: 12) and Kulipossa (2004: 772 ) also draw attention to the fact that there are cases where decentralization can achieve its potential benefits in the absence of those conditions, as well as cases where most of those prerequisites are in place, but decentralization has been undermined. Against the above line of thought, I would argue here that to a certain extent, the unfulfilled democratic potential of decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon can also be associated with the absence of some of the above favourable conditions. These include weak political will among both national and local political authorities, the absence of a vibrant civil society, and the lack of an attentive public. Needless to say, these factors vary across time and regimes. Above all, the absence of these favourable conditions for fulfilling the democratic potential of decentralization appears to result from three aspects: first, all along, decentralization in Indonesia has been perceived and embraced by Indonesian political elites mainly as a matter of political strategy; second, the long-standing authoritarian system of government; and third, the primacy of pragmatic over political decentralization approach, both normatively and empirically. Decentralization in Indonesia: a matter of regimes political strategy? Among the most important factors which determines the design and the actual practices of decentralization and in turn, its expected consequences (e.g., improving public service delivery, maintaining national integration and promoting local democracy) is the motivation of key actors in adopting the policy in the first place (Selee Tulchin 2004). The experiences of many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for instance, attest that the motives of politicians that embrace decentralization policies are not necessarily as virtuous as those who design them. In fact, Smoke and Gomez (2006 : 351; see also, for example, Eaton 2001a; Shah Thompson 2004: 3-4) observe that despite the efficiency and good governance rhetoric surrounding decentralization, the underlying impetus has been inherently political, meaning that the adoption of decentralization has been linked to central governments desire to accomplish their own particular political interests. The factors underlying political interest are country and regime specific. They include, for instance, shoring up their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens usually amidst national political crisis, competition with rival political parties for popular support, pressure from subnational governments for more powers, and opportunity for a ruling party to consolidate power (Selee Tulchin 2004: 299-302; Smoke Gomez 2006 : 351). Many observers believe that these kinds of political motives have partly accounted for the failure of decentralization practices in many developing countries to deliver its democratic potential (Eaton 2001a; Friedman Kihato 2004; Oxhorn 2004). Indonesias decentralization experience is not an exception to the above phenomenon. Although promoting democratization has been one of the stated goals of Indonesias decentralization programs, there has been significant gap between rhetoric and reality. The continuous marginalization of local people from local political processes has been partly rooted in the ‘undemocratic political motives of both national and local political elites in adopting and implementing decentralization policy. As explained in Chapter Three, decentralization in Indonesia has never been constructed in a political vacuum. Hence, I would argue that the degree, pattern and process of decentralization has been strongly influenced by, borrowing Montero and Samuels term (2004: 5), political determinants, i.e., regime responses to changing conditions and incentives within the context of rapid political and economic changes. During the revolution era, decentralization policies recognized the principle of extensive autonomy in all regions of the newly independent Republic. However, such policies were actually constructed by national political elites as a means of establishing and maintaining national authority over many already operating local governments in those regions previously occupied by the colonial government. The polices were also constructed to fulfill other political ends, namely to gain international recognition, as contained in both Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 in the face of Dutch accusations that Indonesia was a puppet state of the Japanese. Thus, despite official claims that decentralization was embraced as an indispensable strategy in materializing a democratic system due to the countrys size and diverse characteristics, the embrace of the policy during this period was not genuinely related to the intention of developing meaningful democratic system within the country since those two basic laws were not followed by any clear operational directions whatsoever on how a democratic system of government would be crafted on the ground. This claim is underscored by the fact that there was no significant alteration in terms of local political processes in Bandung, Cirebon or other regions in the country. As Maryanov (1958: 9) also observed, Many of the institutions and practices adopted or utilized by independent Indonesia have been reflections of those established by the Netherlands East Indies†¦alterations in governmental structure turned out to be minor†¦patterns of administrative behavior remained rooted in the Dutch traditional procedures. Accordingly, the experiences of both Bandung and Cirebon during post-independence until mid 1950s revealed that, except for the establishment of local government structures, the enforcement of Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 allowed neither effective decentralization nor democratization in the regions. Needless to say, the political situation during revolutionary era also contributed to the limited enforcement of the policies in the regions. By the same token, there were three decisive political factors which led national political elites to adopt advanced decentralization policy as contained in Law No. 1 of 1957 which â€Å"greatly increased the power of elected legislative councils in the provinces, regencies, and municipalities† and set for wider regional authority vis-à  -vis the central government (Feith 1962: 552). These factors were, first, a kind of political promise by the government of Republic of Indonesia to the former constituent states of the Republic of the United States of Indonesiaà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢a federal structure created by the Dutchà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢ when they voluntarily decided to join the Republic of Indonesia to establish the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the electoral calculations of various political parties in the Constituent Assembly to have wider mass bases in the regions and to play more influential roles in regional politics. And third, forestalling regional rebellions rooted in growing regional dissatisfaction concerning the central governments unfulfilled promises to carry out development. This was intertwined with other issues such as ethnic tension, economic imbalance and political rivalry between politicians in Java and the Outer Islands. Accordingly, most of the advanced provisions within Law No. 1 were considered to be immediate responses to the above political factors, such as the recognition of the principle of extensive autonomy which was applied based on the capacity of respective local governments and the election of heads of regions by the DPRDs. In addition, the direct election of members of the DPRD and the issuance of Indonesias first Fiscal Balance Law within the same year were also seen as inseparable efforts by national political elites to respond to those political factors. In turn, however, similar to its predecessors, such pragmatic and short term political calculations by national political elites prevented decentralization achieving its idealized outcomes. As Bandung and Cirebons experiences attest, until late 1950s, there was relatively little effective power actually decentralized. In addition, one might conclude that with the introduction of direct election of DPRD members and the election of head of region by the DPRD, local democracy was being crafted on the ground. However, it was not accompanied by channels of popular participation beyond the election. Recapping the above political motives in adopting such advances provisions in Law No. 1, neither central government policy makers nor democratically elected local governments in either case study considered this issue as among their political goals. Accordingly, the two case studies demonstrate that the dynamic of political parties and decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon clearly d id not make local political process more open to participation by local people. Decentralization practices during the Sukarno and Suharto eras obviously confirm the argument that decentralization can be applied within authoritarian regime (Eaton 2001a: 3; Montero Samuels 2004: 10). These cases, however, it was by no means aimed at achieving the various virtues routinely discussed by democratization theorists, but rather at tightening their control over the apparatus of local government at all levels in order to facilitate an authoritarian system. This was particularly fulfilled by making both subnational executives and legislatures appointed and hence, accountable to the national authorities. Thus, these local apparatus were nothing but the instruments of central government with their main function representing the central governments interests in the regions. Yet again, such decentralization was not made in a political vacuum. Prior to the enforcement of Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 concerning Regional Government and Presidential Edict No. 5 of 1960 regarding the Gotong Royong Regional Representative Council and Regional Secretariat (Sekretaris Daerah), Indonesia was hit by escalating political turbulence due to the outbreak of rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the repeated collapse of governing coalitions at the national level in addition to the failure of the Constituent Assembly to make a replacement for the Provisional 1950 Constitution. In turn, these aspects triggered the issuance of a wave of government regulations by Sukarno intended to overhaul the system of government based on his personal concept of Guided Democracyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Ã¢â‚¬ a democracy with a leadership†(van der Kroef 1957: 115). This concept was believed to be an alternative to troublesome â€Å"Western concepts of parliamentary democracy† wh ich had supposedly led to the above political turbulence due to the weakness of government authority and the vehemence of political opposition (van der Kroef 1957: 113). Thus, the new arrangements in local governance were specifically aimed at facilitating Sukarnos own concept of Guided Democracy, which required a total subservience of local governments to central government policies. Sukarno himself was closely involved in setting in place local government institutions, such as heads of regions and local councils. Suharto did not loosen up central control when he took over from Sukarno following the abortive conspiracy by left-wing officers in 1965 until his demise in 1998 (Malley 1999: 75). In fact, severe economic and political crisis inherited from the previous regime contributed to the deepening of authoritarianism that fostered a highly centralized system of government. Suhartos regime believed that this mode of government could retain political and economic stability as its ultimate basis for overcoming the crisis. Another important determinant of Suhartos centralistic policy towards local government system was the need to establish and consolidate an effective government administration over the vast and diverse country (MacAndrews 1986: 27-30). In turn, these variables contributed to the centralistic nature of New Orders ‘decentralization law ¾Law No. 5 of 1974 concerning The Basic Principle of Government in the Regional Government through which â€Å"the regions had neither in fluence over national government policies nor the power to control their own affairs† (Aspinall Fealy 2003: 2). In essence, throughout Suhartos regime, local governments were mainly as implementers of various policies constructed and financially supported by the central government. Thus, both the Sukarno and Suharto regime indeed continued to adopt ‘decentralization policies as represented by the existence of the above law and regulations. However, all were intended to facilitate central government control and greater penetration of society in order to repress vehemence political opposition so that all central government policies and interests would be efficiently implemented down to the lowest level of governments without any resistance. Needless to say, such a mode of ‘decentralization provided no space for citizen participation. Many Indonesians had great hopes that the so-called ‘Big Bang approach to decentralization launched in 2001 would at last bring into reality the various potential benefits of the policy, including democratic local governance. However, various studies (e.g., Anggraini 2007; The Asia Foundation, 2002a; The Asia Foundation, 2002b; Wardana 2007) including two case studies discussed in previous chapters confirm that the decentralization practices have gone without meaningful opening up institutional spaces for greater citizen participation, even though, promoting local democratic governance was among the stated goals of the ‘Big Bang approach. Yet again, a key problem was that realizing democratic potential was not among the main goals of the national political elites when they adopted the policy. Rather, as explained in Chapter Three, the ‘Big Bang policy was motivated by a number of crucial political determinants that had little to do with developing local democracy or even with the neo-liberal agenda of achieving a more effective and efficient public service. These included forestalling national disintegration amidst the emergence of separatist movements and the vocal demands for more autonomy from some resource-rich regions (Sukma 2003: 65; Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271; Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17) ; restoring the legitimacy of the state as well as national elites following the collapse of Suhartos regime, severe economic crisis, and the loss of East Timor (Smoke Gomez 2006 : 353); transferring financial burdens from the center to the regions amidst dramatic decline of central governments financial capacity following t he economic crisis of 1997-1999 (Hidayat Antlov 2004: 271-272); and, no less important, electoral calculus of Habibies to garner the support of the regions prior to the presidential elections (Hofman Kaiser 2004: 17). It was for these strategic reasons, few of which were related to democracy, that the government was willing to embrace a radical approach to decentralization. Further consequence, as attested in Bandung District and City of Cirebon cases, neither clear and firm central governments policies or programs, nor local governance meaningfully accommodated the rhetoric of promoting democratization into reality. Although it was often argued that local democracy was strengthened through the significant empowerment of DPRD vis-à  -vis head of region (Rasyid 2003), this mechanism of political representation in fact could not deliver effective accomplishment of what Fung and Wright (2003: 3) called, the central ideas of democratic politics: facilitating active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that ground a productive economy and healthy society, and, in more radical egalitarian versions of the democratic ideal, assuring that all citizens benefit from the nations wealth. The enforcement of Indonesias latest decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢did not make local political processes more inclusive either, since the law was not motivated by the intention to so. On the surface, it might appear that the formulation of the law was driven by the intention of the Megawati administration to curb the emergence of various abuses of Law No. 22 of 1999, such as rampant corruption and blatant money politics, ethnic parochialism, and the proliferation of excessive taxes which had led to a high cost economy to name some of the most worrying signs. Many perceived that all of these problems were rooted in imperfect laws and the lack of a clearly designed plan (Turner et al. 2003; Legowo 2003; Legowo Djadijono n.d). More compelling is the argument that the attempt was a straightforward act of re-centralization. Such an act is particularly rooted in the nature of decentralization itself, which is not merely as an administrative business, but rather it involves the distributional struggles between national and subnational elites regarding control over local resources (Slater Watson 1989: 511; Montero 2001: 44-45; Hadiz 2003b: 123). Accordingly, meaningful decentralization always faces enormous political obstacles and can be subjected to serious setbacks. One of the salient challenges is the preference of national elites to slow down the process of decentralization and to reinforce their attempts to control it. As Eaton (2001b: 102) suggests, â€Å"national politicians can and do continue to use their legislative authority to modify the initial decision to decentralize†. Thus, for national politicians, â€Å"decentralization is neither inevitable nor irreversible† (Eaton 2001b: 101). I would suggest that the enforcement of the latest Indonesias decentralization lawà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Law No. 32 of 2004à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢perfectly supports this line of argument. This contention is further strengthened by the fact that Law No. 32 restores and strengthens the province and the Ministry of Home Affairs positions in regional affairs at the expense of district governments authority (Eko 2005: 27-29; Ryaas Rashid as cited in Myala 2005). The only new provision within Law No. 32 of 2004 embraced by many as a significant leap in decentralization and local democratization efforts regarded the direct election of heads of regions However, as Fung and Wright argues (2003: 3), the election of both legislative and executive offices are not sufficient to accommodate the influence of local ordinary people on local political processes beyond the election. As the experiences of Bandung and Cirebon attest, there has not been any significant alteration in terms of developing inclusive local political process in the aftermath of the head of region elections. It must be admitted that the promulgation of Local Regulation on Transparency and Participation in Bandung District in 2004 was actually a progressive step in institutionalizing active political involvement of local people. However, it has not been effectively implemented yet. Lack of political will on the part of local to consistently implement the regulation has ensured that it has had only rhetorical value. The claim that popular participation has been channeled through the annual development planning process is specious, since the process is actually still strongly dominated by local government officers. New arrangements in local governance based on Law No. 32 have in fact significantly reduced the power of DPRDs vis-à  -vis heads of regions, since the former no longer have the power to elect and to hold the latter accountable, as regulated in the previous decentralization law. The head of region is now accountable to the central authorities with the president at the apex of the hierarchy. Thus, from a representative democracy point of view, there has been a significant retreat as well. Thus, the lesson seems to be that decentralization in Indonesia has been pursued mainly as a political strategy to fulfill certain political ends, particularly those of national elites within the context of political and economic crisis. Deepening democracy has never been the driving force behind decentralization reform. It is therefore no surprise that we find a lack of political will to realize the democratic potential of decentralization policies at any stage of Indonesias history. Smoke (2003: 12) points out that among the most ubiquitous claims regarding impediments to decentralizations success is the lack of strong political will from various stakeholders involved in the process. Theorists do not all mean the same thing when they talk about ‘political will. For some theorists, strong political will can be seen from the existence of constitutional or legal instruments made by political elites, both national and local (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989: 77-78; Smoke 2003 : 12). Nevertheless, since many cases also show that decentralization policies cannot attain their intended goals,[2] theorists also emphasize that constitutional and legal instruments are not sufficient to ensure workable decentralization policies. As Isaac (2001: 9) firmly argues, Fundamental reforms cannot be merely legislated. Legislation remains empty phrases unless powerful movements oversee their implementation. Legislation is necessary but not sufficient for decentralization. Accordingly, as Rondinelli (1983: 198-200) highlights, political will must also be measured from the actual realization of those normative arrangements particularly by central political authorities transferring planning, decision-making and managerial authority to lower levels of governments, and also by local political authorities sharing their authority with local citizens through opening up effective channels for political participation so that local citizens, especially the poor and marginalized ones, are able to express their needs and demands and to press claims or national and local development resources. Thus, this dimension of political will is also essential, since in many cases, normative arrangements of decentralization are often used to facilitate political aims that have little to do with devolving power to lower level of governments and utilizing this power to effectively fulfill local peoples needs and demands. As Crook (2003: 85-86) stresses, in some African countrie s the real goal is often to consolidate power through political parties and local elites, or to deliberately neutralize local ethnic challenges through fragmenting â€Å"potential local power bases into smaller, weaker, politically insignificant units†. Based on the above line of thought, the lack of political will in pursuing the democratic potential of Indonesias decentralization can be viewed from different perspectives. Normatively, even though the embrace of the policy may initially be claimed to be an indispensable strategy to develop a democratic system of government, its subsequent adoption within constitutions and some existing decentralization laws as well as their operational regulations in the regions so far has never been clear, firm, and consistent. Neither constitutions nor basic legislation and its subsequent operational regulations explicitly note that promoting local democracy is among the intended goals of decentralization programs. During the New Order era, Development Planning (Perencanaan Pembangunan), which was regulated within the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation of 1982 (Permendagri No. 9/1982), was claimed to be adopting a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Empirically, however, as proven in the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon, the planning process was actually highly centralized and practically excluded public participation. The local governments development planning processes were nothing but breaking down the centrally planned parameters. One might find that this was not the case during the post-Suharto era, particularly with regard to Law No.22 of 1999 and Law No. 32 of 2004. Indeed, some argue that Law No. 22 in particular, was intended to promote local democracy and participation, as evident in its preamble: â€Å"in the implementation of Regional Autonomy is deemed to be necessary to emphasize more the principles of democracy, public participation, equal distribution and fairness, and considering the potential and regional diversity† (Turner et al. 2003: 23; see also, Jaya Dick 2001: 216). However, it appears that further details on how local democracy would be implemented on the ground were actually ill-defined. The national government in fact issued a separate regulation, i.e. Government Regulation No. 68 of 1999 regarding public participation in the governmental process.[3] From the title of the regulation, one might easily assume that it was regarding peoples involvement in the governments policy-making process. But, it was actually not. The regulation was actually more about peoples rights rather than facilitating popular participation. Four rights were mentioned: the right to obtain and give information regarding governmental process; the right to get fair service from the government; the right to give advice to the government policies; and the right to legal protection (perlindungan hukum).[4] Thus, the Government Regulation did not specifically mention that popular participation would be the essential component of the government policy-making process. In addition, knowing that popular participation was framed in terms of rights, it means that it was set on voluntary basis. I believe t hat such setting provided weak encouragement for the public to be engaged in governmental process. In the case of Law No. 32, its prologue reads, †¦local government, which manages and oversees its own governmental affairs based on the principles of decentralization and medebewind (co-operating administration) , is directed towards boosting people welfare through service improvement, empowerment, and popular participation, as well as improving regional competitiveness by taking into account the principles of democracy, equal distribution, fairness, specialness (keistimewaan), and specific characteristics (kekhususan) of a region within the system of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. From the above prologue, there would appear to be no significant difference between Law No. 22 and Law No. 32. However, one might argue that central government, as the main architect of the law, showed stronger political will to uphold local democracy in Law No. 32 rather than its predecessor, based on two novel articles within the law, i.e. Article 56 (1) regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government and Article 139 (1) which stated that â€Å"Local community has the right to provide input verbally or in writing for the preparation of or during the deliberation of a proposed bill.† Direct election of head and deputy head of local government is undeniably desirable since, as Peterson (1997: 14) argues, indirect elections have â€Å"tended to perpetuate the strength of political insiders, who are often more accountable to their party hierarchy than to the public at large†. Nevertheless, further analysis of other articles reveals that direct el ection of head and deputy head of local government actually lacked democratic orientation in three aspects: first, the election process was practically dominated by political parties maneuvers, especially during the selection of the candidates for head and deputy head of local government, which is prone to power abuse by ‘selling the office to the highest bidder; second, there was strong intervention from national political party boards in determining the candidates; and third, the election gave no opportunity for independent candidates (Legowo Djadijono n.d). Hence, in the end, local communities have become the last component in the whole series of the election process. In other words, the novel provisions regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government only left the local community marginalized. More importantly, direct election is insufficient for developing strong local democracy since â€Å"elections occur infrequently and allow for only limited citizen input or feedback regarding specific local concerns or policy options† (Posner 2004: 57). Strong local democracy, Posner argues, needs to be backed up by active political participation of local constituencies beyond the mere act of voting. With regard to Article 139 (1), it appears that popular participation was provided for on a voluntarily basis. What I am pointing out here is that the article indicates that popular participation in local policy making process was not an essential factor in the process. This point is underlined by the fact that there were no other provisions within Law No. 32 which obligated local government institutions to engage the local community meaningfully in the process.